Phil Hearse

Writings from the Red Mole archives, 1971–2025

Did Spitting Image get it wrong about the Two Davids?

Labour Briefing no. 46, Summer 1987, p. 10

Transcribed or corrected by hand from the printed page.

Spitting Image's lampoons, with little David Steel being bullied by big David Owen, did the Liberal leader real political damage in the election.

This was the verdict of private Liberal opinion polls — revealed by Des Wilson, in his book about the Alliance election campaign.

But did they get it the wrong way round? Is "little" David about to do a thorough job on "big" David and swallow up the SDP into a new, Liberal-dominated, Party?

In the Alliance row about a merger, David Owen looks to be in real danger of losing the fight to keep the SDP as an independent Party, and thus losing his position as a key leader of the Alliance.

The bitter battle in the SDP about merger stems directly from the sharp electoral rebuff suffered by the Alliance. It has led to a debate not only about merger, but about the whole future of the Alliance.

In order to judge the likely outcome, we have to look at the role the Alliance plays in British politics, and whether that role has now effectively ended.

The 1981 split in the Labour Party and the subsequent launching of the SDP and then the Alliance served a very precise role for the British ruling class. It set up an infernal machine for losing Labour elections, and a permanent pressure on the Labour Party leadership to move to the right.

It is not difficult to grasp the reasoning of ruling class circles which welcomed the formation of the SDP with such glee. By the early 1980s all sections of ruling class opinion considered the Labour Party "dangerous" as a governmental choice.

The "Bennite" revolt and the adoption of nuclear disarmament and other left wing policies put Labour beyond the pale. Thus the alternating two party system, which until 1970 seemed relatively safe, had to be ditched.

In 1964, The Economist and the Financial Times backed Labour in the general election. By the early 1980s such a stance was absolutely inconceivable.

Despite the move of Party policy to the right under Kinnock, the attitude of big business and the bosses to Labour has not fundamentally changed. They are not convinced that Kinnock has purged the left sufficiently. They are especially not convinced by his failure thoroughly and completely to ditch nuclear disarmament.

The best result of the election from their point of view would have been a Tory victory and a good result for the Alliance, preferably pushing Labour into third place. Why didn't they get this result?

There are a number of related factors in the poor showing for the Alliance.

  • Such was the frantic media campaign to elect the Tories at any cost that many Alliance voters switched over to Thatcher.
  • Labour's campaign, though not left wing or socialist, was more professional than in 1983 — and certainly better organised than the shambolic performance of the Alliance.
  • The poorest and most oppressed voted massively for Labour as the only credible alternative government.
  • The Tory Party (as opposed to the ruling class) was worried about the possibility of an Alliance threat, and went out of its way in many constituencies to campaign against the Alliance.

In the class polarisation which the election represented, the Alliance was squeezed until the pips squeaked: the ruling class and the media had done a good job in getting Thatcher re-elected, but damaged their second team option in the process.

The vicious factional fighting in the SDP's Cowley Street headquarters, with William Rodgers, Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins all lined up against Owen over merger, is further destabilising the Alliance.

But the real question behind the issue of merger and the temporary factional line-ups is whether there is still a role for the Alliance in British politics. Does it still serve a useful purpose for the ruling class?

The answer must be a resounding "yes". There is no prospect of any serious ruling class commentators arguing for a return to the two-party system unless and until Labour becomes "safe" again.

That could only happen if the Labour left were utterly crushed, with thousands of expulsions and the ditching of every vestige of left wing policies. Given the existing relationship of forces in the Labour Party and the labour movement as a whole this is a completely impossible scenario in the short term.

Thus the essential role of the Alliance, exerting its permanent pressure on the Party leadership, and as an insurance against Labour electoral victories must be maintained. But politics in the real world is more complicated than the ruling class would like.

Does the damaging Alliance battle over merger mean that they have gone into a spin from which they cannot recover? It is not easy to give a definitive answer.

It seems likely that David Steele's campaign for a merged party will be successful, with David Owen departing to the sidelines. If the SDP ballot on merger gives a "yes" vote then the bulk of SDP activists, candidates and MPs will go along with it. The result will be a merged party dominated by the Liberals, but one probably in better fighting shape than the two separate parties.

If the SDP ballot gives a "no" vote, then the Alliance is in real danger of flying apart.

Of course, David Owen's opposition to merger is motivated by personal ambition and a wish not to see the Liberal Party apparatus take over. But in emphasising policy differences, especially on defence, Owen has a point.

The Liberals have built their forces in the country through the emphasis on community activism, local issue campaigning around "Focus" and tapping incipient radicalism for a thoroughly backward cause.

A large portion of Liberal candidates are suspicious of Owen's gung-ho pro-nuclear stance. A merged party could well give rise to policy fights which Owen and his friends would find distasteful.

Socialists of course will rub their hands with glee at the Alliance tearing itself apart. But it is far too early to start writing obituaries. Given the continued role of the Thatcherites in government, and the strength of the left wing of the labour movement, there is an objective political space for a third party sustained by the ruling class, even if that class does not back an Alliance government or even a coalition.

The real condition for the disappearance of the Alliance is a thorough purging of the Labour Party, and the right wing firmly in control at every level. Such a development could prompt an attempt to reintegrate a section of the SDP leadership back into the Labour Party or a big move, backed by the Labour right, for a coalitionist perspective.

Such a scenario presumes massive defeats for the Labour left and the working class in the battles that lie ahead.

Transcriber’s note

transcribed from the page image, 2 Nov 2026; spelling as printed (David Steele for David Steel, once; "Steel" is spelled correctly in the standfirst). Page label "Feature: the future of the Alliance?" (a section strap, not used as kicker). By-line "By Phil Hearse" in a ruled panel at the head of the third column, mid-text. Complete on the page, no jump. The opening two paragraphs are set in bold and kept as bold; one sentence near the end is set in bold in the paper and kept bold inline. The paper's bullet points are kept as a list. Left out: photo caption ("What future for the Alliance? A suggestion on a election campaign hoarding.") and photo credit; "Scottish Assembly campaign: Donald: where's yer troops?" by Jim Niblock below is a separate article.

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