Gorbachev's Gamble
Socialist Outlook magazine1980sPhil HearseTranscribed or corrected by hand from the printed page.
What attitude should marxists take to the radical changes taking place in the Soviet Union? PHIL HEARSE offers some answers.
The emergence of a reforming wing of the Soviet bureaucracy, personified by Mikhail Gorbachev is one of the major events in world history since World War Two.
The stakes involved in the process which has been unleashed are enormous – for the Russian workers, for the Soviet bureaucracy and for world politics. It follows that the left has a responsibility to try to come to grips with what is going on, study events and eschew simplistic and partial explanations.
While not engaging in unreasoning condemnation, we also have to avoid cheap 'Gorbymania', which is sweeping sections of the left.
It is universally recognised that the Gorbachev project – perestroika and glasnost – is a response to the growing crisis of Soviet society; more precisely to the economic, political and cultural stagnation which has been more and more obvious throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. What is the basic cause of this crisis?
The economic crisis is a crisis of the system of bureaucratic central planning, compounded by a budgetary crisis of the first magnitude. Economic growth rates have been declining, and the waste and inefficiency which this lumbering system gives rise to have become crippling. While the system evolved under Stalin and Khruschev has guaranteed quantitative growth in heavy industry and the production of raw materials (in which the Soviet Union is especially rich) it has been unable to produce the innovative dynamism to maintain high growth rates and regularly to upgrade the quality of production. Trotsky in The Revolution Betrayed pointed out that bureaucratic rule inevitably produces economic inefficiency and inertia, and inevitably poor quality of production.
The Soviet crisis has been intensified by two factors. First, the United States has set out to deliberately financially crippple the Soviets through the arms race. The Soviet Union has devoted a much higher percentage of its GDP to defence than does the USA.
Second, the massive state subsidies on basic goods and services – housing, transport, food and so on – have also created a huge financial and budgetary burden. The latter was directly the product of the reforms of the Khruschev era, which aimed at securing at least the grudging acquiescence of core sectors of the Soviet working class, through a combination of political repression and provision of cheap basic necessities.
Of course, the fact that the basics of life were provided cheaply did not make the bureaucratic regime after Khruschev 'pro-worker' – far from it. These concessions made to the working class on the economic front were a recognition of the enormous social weight of the Soviet working class, and were part of a strategy designed to secure the continued rule of the bureaucracy, by trying to avoid major outbursts of working class discontent. Nonetheless, the living standards of the Soviet workers remained far behind those in the west.
Gorbachev and the ruling wing of the political elite have now decided to make a break with the system as it evolved under Khruschev and Brezhnev, although they are divided on the speed and extent of the reforms. Their basic proposals are:
• To attempt a re-engagement of the Soviet economy with the world capitalist economy, in an attempt to develop trade, and to obtain advanced technology and economic assistance, on much better terms. This involves trying to obtain a new world-wide political arrangement with the capitalist west, a drastic shift in foreign policy.
• Perestroika – economic restructuring. This envisages the utilisation of market relations much more widely; the ending of job security and cheap basic goods for the working class; an attempt to assess the efficiency of enterprisies through 'profit and loss' accounting; the establishment of a private sector of small and medium-sized businesses; the removal of a section of the administrative bureaucracy, although not of the political bureaucracy. Overall these proposals are aimed at shaking up economic lethargy and the worst excesses of administrative inefficiency.
• Glasnost – the introduction of a limited political liberalisation, inside the party and outside, allowing more communication in society at large, and a degree – although strictly limited – of public political debate and argument. This also includes elections for some posts inside the party and state apparatus, and a limited term of office for some state officials.
Where Gorbachev's project has not created just mindless enthusiasm on the left, it has often generated perplexity. Is not Gorbachev's economic policy basically about the virtues of the market? And is not his foreign policy about more compromises with the imperialists? But then again, aren't his democratic reforms essentially progressive? How does all this fit together?
Before answering these questions, we should ponder exactly why Gorbachev and the team around him have introduced this particular combination of policies in the way they have. In our view the explanation is essentially the following.
First, Gorbachev's international policy, aimed at creating a new regime of international peaceful co-existence is premised on the idea that the only way to reverse the relationship of forces with imperialism on the political, military and economic fronts, is world-wide compromise – a new modus vivendi with imperialism. From the viewpoint of the bureaucracy this is quite logical: the only alternative would be to link themselves to broad currents in the international working class on the basis of anti-capitalist struggle. But after decades of stalinism there is not the basis of support and enthusiasm for the Soviet Union in the western working class; neither is the Soviet bureaucracy – which itself rests on containing the power of the Soviet working class – prepared to tie its fate to that of class struggle internationally, for obvious reasons.
Second, the introduction of perestroika and glasnost in one move, linking one to the other, is very significant. In other East European countries economic reforms have been tried without simultaneously making concessions to the working class, the intelligentsia and the technocrats on the front of democratic reforms. Gorbachev hopes to consolidate a social bloc which identifies his whole project with democratisation and supports it for that reason – despite the economic sacrifices which the working class is called upon to make. In addition, Gorbachev's advisors have correctly identified the crucial linkage between economic efficiency, technological dynamism and the free flow of information. It is impossible to have much scientific and technical dynamism in a country where most scientists are prohibited access to photocopiers for security reasons.
What, then should be the attitude of revolutionary socialists to the Gorbachev reforms, to perestroika and glasnost?
First, we should not go along with the basic thrust of Soviet foreign policy, even if it does put the cold war factions of the US government on the defensive, and show them much more obviously as the aggressors. It may be that there are aspects of the new Soviet foreign policy which lead to outcomes we can support – the INF deal for example, and perhaps other arms reduction deals.
Yet world-wide peaceful co-existence is certainly not socialist internationalism, championing of the oppressed or the international working class. In some ways it is the direct opposite – an even more narrow following of the state interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.
However, precisely because the new policy is based on a rigorous definition of Soviet bureaucratic interests, as opposed to those of the international working class, it may in some instances collide with those of imperialism. For example, it is far from certain that the Soviet Union is prepared to give up all its military outposts and interests worldwide without very considerable concessions. Whereas they are quite capable of selling out the struggle in Angola or Nicaragua, there is no guarantee that they will do so.
As far as the economic reform is concerned, revolutionary socialists should note two things. First, of course Gorbachev's advisors do identify real and urgent problems – the crisis of bureaucratically centralised planning. But their solutions are not pro-working class, socialist solutions. The socialist answer is the democratisation of the planning process, the unleashing of the creative power of the masses, popular sovereignty over basic economic decisions – if you like, a national regime of workers' control.
Gorbachev's proposals are far from that. They are a reform of bureaucratic planning, which introduces some measures to end its over-centralisation, but above all introduces short and medium-term austerity for the working class. The implicit deal is that then economic rationalisation will create better economic conditions for the workers at some point in the future. Right now workers have to accept austerity. There is a good deal of conscious hypocrisy in the Gorbachevites' crusade against the 'bureaucrats'. Lower rank administrators may have to change jobs and be downgraded: but the bureaucratic political elite will be untouched. The people who suffer the real sacrifices will be the working class.
However much we reject perestroika as a real solution to the problems of bureaucratic planning, we should also note however it is not in any way whatsoever a restoration of capitalism, or going in the direction of restoring capitalism. Even the most extreme Gorbachevite economic theorists are talking about a marketisation of economic relations within the framework of the plan: that is to say, within the framework of a state-owned, planned, economy even if it has a smallish and subordinate private sector within it.
It is ludicrous to suggest, as do some extreme stalinists, that Gorbachev is taking the 'capitalist road'. It is true, however, that perestroika will deepen existing inequalities between workers and bureaucrats and among workers themselves.
'Glasnost' – political liberalisation – should not simply be rejected by socialists as a 'fraud'. It is true that a real democratisation, which gives sovereign power to the popular masses, is not what Gorbachev has in mind. Nonetheless political liberalisation and more official tolerance, however circumscribed, will give the masses the opportunity to overcome the long-term de-politicisation created by long decades of Stalinism.
Socialists always give critical support to democratic reforms which allow the working class, the popular masses and the political left more space to formulate and articulate their demands. The obvious parallel is political liberalisation under authoritarian capitalist regimes, which is never simply rejected by socialists. We support more democratic rights – but with one proviso: we think the democratisation process should go all the way.
Gorbachev's proposals for perestroika and glasnost have opened up the most important political ferment in the Soviet Union since 1956. This has taken several forms:
• The reawakening of the struggle of oppressed nationalities, especially that of the Armenian minority in Azerbaijan and in the Baltic states.
• The beginning of a political polarisation inside the working class over the question of the economic reforms.
• A struggle inside the party and the bureaucracy over the tempo and extent of the reforms – including the Politburo and the Secretariat.
• The emergence of independent political clubs, including a federation of socialist clubs which held it first conference last November with 600 people attending.
There is no doubt that a substantial section of the working class sees the perestroika reforms as a threat to their interests, and they are right about that. On the other hand, it seems that there are sections of industrial workers who are enthused by the Gorbachev project. For example, many workers, including party members, supported Boris Yeltsin when he was sacked as Moscow party chief for attacking bureaucratic privileges.
After the 19th conference, a demonstration of more than 100,000 people was held in Kaliningrad to support glasnost and perestroika. This was not simply an 'official' demonstration, although party members participated. So did supporters of the socialist clubs and thousands of ordinary workers.
It would perhaps be correct to say that there is a battle going on for the hearts and minds of the working class, with the Gorbachvites appealing to the possibility of long-term democratisation and a 'better life', while conservative opponents appeal to the workers' justified sense of their real, short term, material interests.
The national question is an explosive issue in the Soviet Union because stalinism trod under foot so many nationalities and national rights. Any political liberalisation is almost certain to throw up new national demands and movements: in certain instances – for example the Ukraine – national demands could be an important axis of political revolution.
However the basic programmatic position of revolutionary socialists to national demands should be support for the right of national self-determination, but not necessarily for national separation. Separation should be a right, if the majority want it, but is not necessarily a policy which socialists advocate. In general our position should be for national rights within a socialist federation – a real union of Soviet republics!
The disputes inside the bureaucratic elite are difficult to read precisely because we have so little to go on in terms of hard facts. The statements of the protagonists are often coded and ambiguous. Nontheless, it is clear that a big majority of the bureaucratic political elite staunchly supports reform – although many bureaucrats at lower level, who risk losing their jobs and privileges, probably do not. But Gorbachev's 'number two', Ligachev, who chairs the meetings of the Politburo, is clearly unhappy about too much democracy and too much economic reform. While not exactly 'Brezhnevite', Ligachev certainly represents a faction which could challenge Gorbachev if he was seen to be failing.
On the other hand, Boris Yeltsin, who advocated an attack on bureaucratic privilege as such – for which he was sacked – represents a reform current within the he bureaucracy which seems radical compared with Gorbachev – and certainly compared with Ligachev. The Yeltsin people seem to have links with some in the socialist clubs.
The socialist clubs themselves are a quite remarkable political development. The political orientation of key figures like Boris Kagarlitsky can be seen from the demonstration they held in Pushkin Square on the eve of the 19th Congress. Called by the 'Organising Committee for a Popular Front' (!) the rally was held under red flags – and portraits of Mikhail Gorbachev! It demanded 'All power to the Soviets' – but democratically elected, real Soviets. And it demanded that perestroika be speeded up.
These contradictory positions reveal much about the present viewpoint of the clubs. They are for socialist democracy and renewal, and are utilising the opportunities provided by glasnost to advance their demands. They see the Ligachev people as their biggest enemies in the short-term, and they are probably right about that. It is among people like those in the socialist clubs that the nucleus of a real democratic socialist opposition can be built.
Will the Gorbachev project succeed? Partly this depends on what happens internationally. Gorbachev has placed a lot on the imperialists doing a 'good' deal and being prepared to come up with the technology, trade and bank loans. If they don't he will be in some trouble. But in any case, Gorbachev has placed an awful lot on his own rhetoric being true – and it almost certainly isn't. Economic reforms, involving limited marketisation, have been tried in other Eastern European countries, without notable success. Gorbachev is going for simultaneous restructuring and large economic growth, and it is doubtful if he will get both.
Those workers who support Gorbachev will be very disappointed if they make economic sacrifices and relatively little comes their way in terms of democracy and higher living standards. But Gorbachev has a more immediate problem with [...] working class. He won a cheap victory at the 19th confe[rence] because the Ligachev people rolled with the punches – [...] their time.
But lower down the apparatus, there are thousands [of] bureaucrats who want to disrupt reform, and there are [...] of party members who want to do the same. Gorbac[hev has] really to mobilise the workers in an active fight to def[eat the con]servatives if he is to push his reforms through. There[...]
To call on the workers to impose perestroika [...] against conservative bureaucrats could lead to a [...] of working class ferment which would outflank [...] develop into a struggle for real democracy. Gor[bachev is walk]ing a tightrope between the conservative se[ctions of the] bureaucracy and the working class. It won't take a [...] fall off.