Not such a strong state?
Socialist Outlook magazine1980sPhil HearseScanned print read by OCR, and not yet proofread: expect run-together words, dropped letters and, where a piece began partway down a page, a few lines of its neighbour. The printed page is the authority.
PHIL HEARSE replies to critics of his In Depth article in Socialist Outlook No.11.
My article 'The Coming of the Strong State' excited a flurry of critical interest in the pages of Socialist Outlook #12. A large part of John Lister's article was devoted to rejecting some of its ideas, and on top of that there were three critical letters.
Socialist Worker Review devoted an editorial to rejecting the idea of the 'strong state', and quoted from my article – though of course it failed to actually name Socialist Outlook. It is impossible to cover all the ground mentioned by the critics. The main point I want to make is that we should debate the substance of the article and not definitions or labels.
OK, so I started it. I said that Thatcher's style of rule – the extreme concentration and personalisation of political power in the government – had been called 'semi-Bonapartism' by Socialist Newsletter and that seemed as good a term as any. Clearly it wasn't, because hundreds of words were devoted to refuting the idea that we had fully-fledged Bonapartist rule – see Trevor Wongsam's letter for example. Well, actually I didn't say that we had Bonapartist rule, but leave that aside. If comrades object to the label 'semi-Bonapartist', let's dump it: the central core of my argument remains intact.
What in fact did I say? First that the repressive apparatuses of the state had been considerably strengthened under Thatcher, through a battery of new anti-working class laws and the jettisoning of 'corporatist' styles of government which attempted to incorporate the trade union and labour bureaucracy. Second that all this amounted to a qualitative 'strengthening' of the state, despite Thatcher's anti-state rhetoric. Third, that these powers of government were the most extremely repressive this century outside of wartime (an argument hardly refuted by John Lister saying that Winston Churchilll also enjoyed such powers!). And fourth that the left had every interest in building alliances with democratic public opinion to defend democratic rights.
The most sustained and serious critique of what I said was John Lister's article 'Getting to grips with Thatcherism'. I thought it was a good article, and agreed with much of it, reflecting as it does much of Socialist Outlook's thinking. But the nub of the disagreement I have with John seems to be this: to what extent has state repression been a source of Thatcher's victories against the working class? To what extent has it changed the balance of class forces? And isn't it true that the main problem has been lack of militant working class leadership rather than state repression?
It goes without saying, I hope, that the question of leadership, and the need for a class struggle leadership, must be to the forefront of every Marxist analysis of Britain today. But to say, as do John and Brian Elkington, 'who needs Bonapartism when you've got Kinnock?' misses out an important dimension. The Thatcherites don't just have to deal with the Labour and trade union leaders, they have to deal with the workers and the oppressed – and their struggles. State repression has played a key role in some central disputes (I restrict myself to industrial disputes only for space reasons, although many other examples could be given), even given the betrayal of the bureaucratic leaders. The example of the Seafarers' strike illustrates this.
The turning point – the point at which Seafarers' leader McCluskie effectively capitulated – was when the High Court sequestrated the NUS funds and property. Of course we opposed the sell-out by the NUS leadership, and the lack of solidarity from the rest of the union bureaucracy. But to say that the course of this dispute was just determined by the sell-out of the leaders – that's a joke. The new anti-union laws added a crucial dimension, a key pressure on the leadership, which hastened their capitulation and materially worsened the chances of winning the strike.
The 'betrayals of the leadership' line of argument holds good for dozens and dozens of struggles so long as the labour movement is dominated by the bureaucracy. The point is however that bureaucratic intentions operating in different circumstances get very different results.
The TUC betrayed the miners and the Wapping printers. Of course. But didn't the intervention of a nationally co-ordinated police force against the pickets in the miners strike worsen the relationship of forces significantly? Wasn't the fact that Orgreave couldn't become another 'Saltley Gate' an important element in the strike? And didn't para-military style policing at Wapping significantly, even decisively, prevent the TNT lorries being stopped by the mass pickets?
The deepening repression by the police and courts was of course just one part of my argument. Thatcher has attempted to centralise national government control of local and regional government; has intervened to overturn the post-1945 consensus by intervening ina whole range of industries and institutions like education in a unprecedented way; and has personalised power around herself and a few advisers in a way, as I said before, unprecedented outside of wartime. None of this is really challenged by any of my critics. Some comrades don't even like the term 'strong state' because they think it implies military dictatorship or fascism. But no one can deny that we have, at least a much stronger state, a more repressive state, a more centralised, determined and authoritarian bourgeois leadership team – and a very right wing one at that – than has existed since 1945.
Now, there were some hasty formulations in my original article which might have suggested that this all amounted to a change in the form of state. Britain remains a bourgeois democracy – albeit a very repressive and authoritarian one. But the label doesn't leave any room for complacency. Civil liberties are under sustained attack, and it is whistling in the wind to say, well never mind, we can still define this as bourgeois democracy !
Two final points. First, some critics (particularly cdes Elkington, Collier and, by inference, Socialist Worker Review) suggest that this whole analysis is a cover for popular frontism. My reply is, quite honestly, I think these comrades don't have much idea about the distinction between a popular front and a united front. To unite with (bourgeois) democratic public opinion in defence of particular democratic demands or rights has nothing to do with wanting to create a class collaborationist coalition government with the bourgeoisie. Did these comrades think that the campaigns against Clause 28 and the Alton anti-abortion bill were dreadful popular fronts? They involved mobilising democratic public opinion, middle class liberals, clerics and the like: and quite right too. Predictably Socialist Worker Review has the most crass line, finding it hard to see that the fight on democratic rights is part of the class struggle.
Finally, one of the weakest points in the debate between the far left and Marxism Today over the years has been the denial by some comrades that there was anything special about 'Thatcherism'. Some even denounced the term 'Thatcherism' as a mealy mouthed concession to rotten Marxism Today popular frontism!
Thatcherism is something very special indeed for the bourgeoisie. It is a decisive attempt to overturn the welfare state, mixed-economy, post-1945 consensus. It has had many successes. And its methods, to quote the title of Andrew Gamble's excellent recent book, are The Free Economy and the Strong State.