Phil Hearse

Writings from the Red Mole archives, 1971–2025

Fresh battles ahead for liberation struggle

Socialist Outlook no. 37, 13 February 1993, pp. 8-9 · with Michael Bam

Transcribed or corrected by hand from the printed page.

The De Klerk Nationalist Party government and the ANC seem close to a deal. What will this mean for South Africa? Socialist Outlook spoke to MICHAEL BAM, a member of the executive of the Workers Organisation of Socialist Action (WOSA).

What is the present stage of the struggle in South Africa? Has the CODESA negotiation process put the left and the mass movement in difficulty?

WOSA characterises the present period as that of the carrot and the stick; De Klerk is using a combination of repression and concessions to try to lock the ANC into the reform process.

We have seen the ANC make many concessions, on one-person one vote, nationality and the principle of a unitary state without 'homelands'. The mass movement as a whole has gone into decline; there's a sort of depression where everything is left to the negotiations.

A key turning point was defeat and sell-out of the NUMSA (metalworkers) strike last August; this was a massive strike defeated not by the bourgeoisie but by the leadership betrayals. The trade union movement has lost membership rather than winning new members, and this is symptomatic.

Can the ANC really compromise on the principle of one-person, one vote?

It is significant that even Communist Party (SACP) leader Joe Slovo has come out in favour of a 'sunset clause' in a negotiated settlement; that would give the whites an effective parliamentary veto for 5-10 years.

The model here is the 1980 Lancaster House agreement which gave independence to Zimbabwe.

There has been tremendous opposition inside the ANC, with opposition form the Youth League, but in the end the ANC executive accepted the position of Joe Slovo with just a few minor amendments. So yes, for five to ten years there will be no 'one person, one vote'; and a lot can happen in that period to further disrupt a transition to majority rule.

De Klerk's strategy is two-fold. First to guarantee a veto for the whites, but also to build up a 'national front', a bloc of right wing forces against the ANC and the liberation movement. This would involve the ruling Nationalist Party, but also the puppet leaders of the 'homelands' and their supporters, as well as the Zulu-based Inkatha 'National Freedom Party' of Buthelezi.

This is the originality and cleverness of De Klerk's position. Not to try to hold back the tide of history, but to manage change to preserve capitalism and position of the white bourgeoisie.

The ANC have agreed that there will have to be a 70 per cent majority in parliament on constitutional change. The right-wing bloc can always prevent that, unless the ANC won every single black vote, which is impossible.

Has the negotiation process brought concrete gains to the non-white population, in terms of living standards, social security, health etc?

The economic situation has deteriorated tremendously in South Africa, as part of the world crisis. Inflation is rampant at 19 per cent; unemployment is 4 million in a population of 30 million. All social services, health, pensions etc. are still divided on black-white lines, with the situation much worse for the black population.

The average wage in South Africa for a black family of 5-6 is 400 rand a month (£67 sterling; FF 530); the governments's own estimate is that such a family needs R2400 (£400/FF3200). So poverty is very widespread.

People from the rural areas are moving to the cities, so there is a major housing shortage with mass squatting. The drought in the north east has played a tremendous role in that, and the abolition of the Group Areas Act means that families can now move to the cities to be with the husbands to work there.

Because of the economic situation, South Africa has its own IMF austerity plan, which calls for 'retrenchment' of the state sector, which means mass sackings of government employees. But this falls on the black population. About 45 per cent of the white working population is employed by the state, a totally unreal figure.

These people cannot all be sacked. So it is the black teachers, health workers etc who have to go. For example in black schools now the teacher-student ratio is 1:70.

One effect of the economic crisis has been to put a temporary stop to the growth of the black and coloured middle class, which grew rapidly in the 1980s, and which often plays a conservative political role.

How does WOSA assess the strength of Inkatha? Is its campaign of mass terror against the liberation movement?

Inkatha has got mass support in Natal, and in the Transvaal among the migrant workers in the hostels.

The migrant workers were relatively socially isolated, and Inkatha was clever enough to see the possibilities to organise them. Its campaign on the theme of Zulu nationalism has been very effective, even affecting people of Zulu origin inside the ANC.

The campaign of terror continues, especially in Natal. But such is the state of the mass movement, that really the murders are just accepted. The ANC don't want to be seen as disruptive of the transition process, so there is no effective self-defence. The murder of 10 people in one night hardly gets reported in the press anymore.

Have other forces inside the liberation movement, for example the Pan African Congress (PAC), been able to take advantage of the 'rightist' position of the ANC to build themselves?

Originally the PAC came out with a very militant opposition to the negotiating process, using a rhetoric of armed insurrection.

They recruited on this basis, especially among the youth. Now this position has been eroded by the decision of the PAC to meet with the government and become involved in the negotiation process. PAC's youth wing AZANU and its student wing have both opposed this, and there have been a number of splits in the PAC, especially in the Transvaal; now the youth have split from the PAC.

The recent statements of Joe Slovo that there had to be an 'historic compromise' seemed to be a sharp rightward turn for the SACP. Is this accepted throughout the party? How big is the CP, and is it the dominant left force?

Joe Slovo's statements has not been received very well inside the rank and file, but there seems to be agreement in the Communist Party leadership, with the exception of a few leftist leaders like Chris Hani.

Once again, the youth have rejected this position, and they are the strongest sector of SACP support outside the organised workers movement.

We think that Slovo is trying to sell the SACP as a kind of new social democratic party, on the model of social democratic parties in Europe, making a bid for that terrain in South Africa.

At the moment the SACP is the dominant left force, with 8-10,000 members. It is particularly strong inside the trade union federation COSATU.

The militant so-called 'workerists' who built COSATU in the 1980s, largely capitulated and joined the SACP, or kept quiet – and this is a real tragedy.

Through this the SACP was able to neutralise the militant wing of the trade union movement and incorporate it into the projects of the ANC. For example Cyril Ramaphosa, former leader of the mineworkers, is now the general secretary of the ANC.

What are the prospects of the left?

In the medium and long-term we still think there are big possibilities. The traditions of the 1980s rebellion and trade union struggles are too strong to just disappear, no matter how difficult the current situation.

Still you find in struggles and debates the demands for socialism and workers control spontaneously re-appear, whatever the position of the leadership and despite the bureaucratisation of the unions.

What is the central political line of WOSA, its themes of intervention and demands?

WOSA finds itself in a difficult position. Its central strategic demand is for a Constituent Assembly on the basis of one-person, one vote.

But it is a hard struggle to push foreword this line, given the dominance of the negotiation process and the compromises of the leadership of the liberation movement.

But you have to look at the longer-term prospects. The tradition of socialism is still very strong in the workers movement. And there are still important workers struggles over pay and conditions, when inflation is 19 per cent. WOSA tries to root itself in these struggles.

The youth in South Africa are decisive, because it is such a young country, with the majority of the population under 30 years old. Youth unemployment must be over 3 million, and that in a country of 30 million! These youth are angry. As the transition process continues, and fails to bring either democracy or prosperity for the non-white masses, the reaction of the youth will be very sharp. That is the importance of continuing to build an alternative, revolutionary, leadership in South Africa.

Interview by Phil Hearse

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